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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
It is well  known  that highly  pathogenic  avian  inﬂuenza  (HPAI)  viruses  emerge  through  mutation  of  pre-
cursor  low  pathogenic  avian  inﬂuenza  (LPAI)  viruses  in  domestic  poultry  populations.  The  potential  for
immunological  cross-protection  between  these  pathogenic  variants  is recognised  but  the  epidemiologi-
cal  impact  during  co-circulation  is  not  well understood.  Here  we  use  mathematical  models  to investigate
whether  altered  ﬂock  infection  parameters  consequent  to primary  LPAI  infections  can  impact  on  the
spread  of HPAI  at  the  population  level.  First  we used  mechanistic  models  reﬂecting  the  co-circulatory
dynamics  of  LPAI  and  HPAI  within  a  single  commercial  poultry  ﬂock.  We found  that  primary  infections
with  LPAI  led  to  HPAI  prevalence  being  maximised  under  a scenario  of  high  but partial  cross-protection.nterference
ross-protection
oultry
athematical models
We  then  tested  the  population  impact  in  spatially-explicit  simulations  motivated  by  a  major  avian
inﬂuenza  A(H7N1)  epidemic  that  afﬂicted  the Italian  poultry  industry  in 1999–2001.  We  found  that
partial  cross-protection  can  lead  to a prolongation  of  HPAI  epidemic  duration.  Our ﬁndings  have  impli-
cations  for  the  control  of HPAI  in  poultry  particularly  for settings  in which  LPAI  and  HPAI  frequently
co-circulate.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Avian inﬂuenza is a viral disease of poultry which, as well as
aving severe socio-economic consequences, continues to pose a
igniﬁcant threat to public health and global food security (McLeod
t al.; Sonaiya, 2007). The highly pathogenic (HPAI) form, associ-
ted with up to 100% ﬂock mortality, has been a particular concern
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/).license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
for governments worldwide (Alexander, 2000). The prevention and
control of emergent HPAI in the poultry source is critical to ensure
the economic and public health threat is not extended to new set-
tings or to novel virus subtypes in the future.
A necessary though insufﬁcient determinant of avian inﬂuenza
pathogenicity in poultry is a mutation to the virus’s genome causing
enhanced cleavability of the viruses’ haemagglutinin (HA) glyco-
protein. This mutation is believed to evolve during circulation of
LPAI viruses, often of wild bird origin (de Jong et al., 2009), among
domestic poultry (Banks et al., 2001; Garcia et al., 1996; Horimoto
and Kawaoka, 1994; Pasick et al., 2005; Suarez et al., 2004). There-
fore, although wild bird reservoirs can be a direct source of both
LPAI and HPAI incursions in domestic poultry, in many cases, the
emergence of novel HPAI mutants is consequent to pre-existing
LPAI outbreaks in poultry. When these evolutionary transitions
arise, the emergent HPAI will co-circulate with the antigenically
similar but pathogenically distinct LPAI viruses (Monne et al., 2014).
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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his particular scenario of HPAI arising through the prolonged cir-
ulation of LPAI therefore provides an opportunity to study the
cological relationship between different pathogenic variants of
vian inﬂuenza.
In the context of human disease, it is known that the local
o-circulation of different viruses produces the potential for epi-
emiological interference, whereby exposure to one virus alters the
nfection trends of another, most likely as a consequence of tempo-
ary immunity (Bang, 1975; Dietz, 1979). Recent animal studies
ave contributed to the growing evidence that temporary non-
peciﬁc innate immune responses may  lead to interference among
nﬂuenza viruses (Laurie et al., 2015). In the case of antigenically
imilar variants of a pathogen such as LPAI and HPAI, interference
ay  similarly manifest at the host scale through immunologi-
al cross-protection (CP); the prevention or partial inhibition of
n individual host to future infections may  lead to altered trans-
ission dynamics during pathogen co-circulating. In the case of
nﬂuenza, cross-protection as a consequence of adaptive immu-
ity is expected since neutralizing antibodies and cross-reactive
ell-mediated immunity are known to act across homo- and hetero-
ubtypically diverse viruses (Ekiert et al., 2011; Seo and Webster,
001; Wang et al., 2010). Hereafter we collectively refer to the
ross-virus effects of adaptive and innate immune responses as
mmunological cross-protection.
Greater consideration to the effect of immunological cross-
rotection on the co-circulatory dynamics of LPAI and HPAI could
rove valuable for predicting the long-term epidemiological suc-
ess of emergent HPAI mutants. Based on theories of ecological
ompetition (Ojosnegros et al., 2012), it is anticipated that immune-
ediated competition for susceptible hosts will favour infection
ith LPAI viruses over HPAI viruses because of their comparatively
ow virulence, longer associated infectious periods, and conse-
uently greater population-level transmissibility (all other factors
eing equal). However, it has been hypothesised that HPAI can
nvade a poultry population despite high mortality rates as a con-
equence of partial immunological cross-protection (de Leo and
olzoni, 2012). This is readily explained by the outcome of prior
xposures to homo-and heterosubtypic avian inﬂuenza viruses
hich may  result in attenuated disease, thereby prolonging the
nfectious periods of HPAI-infected birds without full protection
gainst viral shedding (Fereidouni et al., 2009; Seo and Webster,
001; van der Goot et al., 2003, 2005).
Unveiling the potential importance of immunological cross-
rotection on the competitive success of HPAI viruses is however
ompounded by other infection life history traits. For example,
wing to their enhanced cleavability, it is reasonable to presume
PAI viruses have a lower infectious dose, shorter latency, and
reater per capita transmission rate than LPAI. Furthermore, virus
urvivability as well as the environmental component of avian
nﬂuenza transmission (via infectious faeces thus removing the
ependency on host survival), further obscure understanding into
he likely inﬂuence of LPAI infections on the spread of HPAI through
mmunological CP. At the population scale, non-immune related or
ecological’ mechanisms of interference are also possible through
nterventions that alter population demography (Rohani et al.,
003). In the poultry setting, such an effect is plausible through
ational veterinary disease interventions that enforce the culling
f infected ﬂocks thereby temporarily altering the demography of
usceptible poultry.
Here we aimed to use mathematical models to quantify
he impact of immunological cross-protection on the spread of
mergent HPAI within a commercial poultry population at both
ithin-ﬂock and between-ﬂock scales. This study was motivated
y a major epidemic of avian inﬂuenza A(H7N1) that afﬂicted the
talian poultry industry during 1999 to 2001. This epidemic is an
mportant example of HPAI emergence through the mutation of aics 17 (2016) 27–34
precursor LPAI virus before the statutory control of LPAI was  intro-
duced (Busani et al., 2009; Capua and Marangon, 2000; Monne et al.,
2014).
2. Two-pathogen within-ﬂock infection transmission
model
We  ﬁrst investigated the impact of immunological CP on HPAI
transmission dynamics within a single ﬂock using a two-pathogen
deterministic S-E-I-R model under frequency-dependent transmis-
sion. This model was adapted to reﬂect the spread of avian inﬂuenza
within a densely populated commercial ﬂock which is known to
occur through aerosol and environmental transmission pathways.
Fig. 1 provides a schematic overview of the model; S, E, I, R denotes
the proportion of birds in the infection classes Susceptible, Exposed
(infected but not yet infectious), Infectious and Removed, and an
additional F class represents contamination of the poultry house
environment with infectious faeces. Subscripts 1, 2, and 3 denote
birds infected with LPAI, HPAI, and birds co-infected with both
variants respectively.
Infectious birds excrete a single gram of infectious faeces at rate
 (days−1) which decays in the poultry house environment at rate 
(days−1). The per capita rate at which new infections are generated
via direct bird-to-bird contact through the aerosol route, and indi-
rectly via infectious faeces, is given by a (days−1) and f (days−1)
respectively. Newly infected birds undergo a latent period given
by 1/  followed by an infectious period given by 1/.  In the case
of LPAI infected birds, complete protection against both strains is
acquired at a rate of 1 (days−1), whilst birds with a primary HPAI
infection die at a rate 2 (days−1). A background level of non-avian
inﬂuenza-induced mortality is applied to birds in classes S, E1, I1,
E2, I2, E3, I3 at rate  (days−1). Parameter values and ranges are
provided in Table 1.
We assume that immunological cross-protection reduces (i) the
susceptibility of LPAI infected birds to secondary HPAI infection,
and (ii) the mortality rate (or lengthening of the infectious period)
of birds co-infected with both variants (Seo and Webster, 2001; van
der Goot et al., 2003, 2005). Secondary HPAI infections are acquired
at a rate of 2a(1-)  + 2f(1-) (days−1), and the mortality rate of
co-infected birds is given by 2(1-) (days−1), where  denotes the
proportional reduction in both transmission and mortality rates as
a consequence of immunological cross-protection.
The full model ordinary differential equations are as follows:
dS
dt
= −S
(
ˇ1aI
′
1 + ˇ1f F1
)
− S
(
ˇ2aI
′
2 + ˇ2f F2
)
− S
dE1
dt
= S
(
ˇ1aI
′
1 + ˇ1f F1
)
− ıE1 − E1
dI1
dt
= ıE1 −
(
ˇ2a(1 − )I
′
2 + ˇ2f (1 − )F2
)
I1 − 1I1 − I1
dF1
dt
= εI1 − I1
dE2
dt
= S
(
ˇ2aI
′
2 + ˇ2f F2
)
− ıE2 − E2
dI2 = ıE2 − 2I2 − I2dt
dF2
dt
= εI2 − I2
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Fig. 1. Two-pathogen within-ﬂock model schematic. Mechanistic model representing the co-circulatory dynamics of LPAI and HPAI transmission within a single densely
populated commercial poultry ﬂock. The proportions of birds in each infection class are denoted as follows: S = susceptible, E = exposed (but not yet infectious), I = infectious,
R  = removed (immune or dead). An additional F class represents the build-up of infectious faeces in the poultry house environment. Subscripts 1, 2 and 3 denote infection
with  LPAI, HPAI, and co-infection with both variants respectively. Solid arrows indicate the transition of birds from one infection state to the next. Dashed arrows indicate
the  contribution of birds in classes I and F to the forces of infection that generate newly infected birds. Dotted arrows in relation to F classes indicate the build-up (inward
arrows)  and decay (outwards arrows) of infectious faeces in the poultry house environment. Immunological cross-protection was incorporated through the assumed action
of  (i) reduced susceptibility of LPAI-infected birds to secondary HPAI infection, and (ii) increased survival of birds with secondary HPAI infection. See Table 1 for full details
of  the model parameters.
Table 1
Two-strain within-ﬂock model parameters.
Parameter Description (units) Baseline value Sensitivity ranges Reference
1 LPAI transmission rate (days−1) 2* – Saenz et al. (2012)
2 HPAI transmission rate (days−1) 2* 0.05–4 Saenz et al. (2012)
1 LPAI latency loss rate (days−1) 1* – Saenz et al. (2012)
2 HPAI latency loss rate (days−1) 1* 0.2–4 Saenz et al. (2012)
1 LPAI-induced immunity rate (days−1) 0.125* – Saenz et al. (2012)
2 HPAI-induced mortality rate (days−1) 0.5* – Saenz et al. (2012)
 LPAI/HPAI faecal excretion rate (days−1) 24 – –
1 LPAI decay rate (grams/days−1) 1.2 – Shortridge et al. (1998)
2 HPAI decay rate (grams/days−1) 1.2 0.001–3 Shortridge et al. (1998)
 Background mortality rate (days−1) 0.0005‡ – McMullin (2006)
 Proportional reduction in susceptibility and mortality due to cross-protection 1 0–1 –
S . *Mea
i nmen
H
I
I
l
b
t
i
eubscripts 1 and 2 denote LPAI-speciﬁc and HPAI-speciﬁc parameters respectively
nformed the bird “removal” rates; †viral decay rates in the poultry house enviro
PAI-speciﬁc parameters investigated in sensitivity analyses.
dE3
dt
= I1
(
ˇ2a(1 − )I
′
2 + ˇ2f (1 − )F2
)
− ıE3 − E3
dI3
dt
= ıE3 − 2
(
1 − 	
)
I3 − I3
dR
dt
= 1I1 + 2I2 + 2
(
1 − 	
)
I3 +  (S + E1 + I1 + E2 + I2 + E3 + I3)
′
1 = I1 + I3
′
2 = I2 + I3
The model was constructed to reﬂect a typical turkey ﬂock
ocated in northeast Italy with a median population size of 15,000
irds (although we note that our results are qualitatively insensi-
ive to ﬂock size). Each outbreak was initiated with a single HPAI
nfected bird seeded among a hypothetical background of pre-
xisting LPAI infected birds. All simulated HPAI outbreaks declinedn infectious periods of 8 days and 2 days for LPAI and HPAI infections respectively
t assume an absence of infectivity one day post-infection. Highlighted rows are
within 90 days; the typical duration of a production cycle of fatten-
ing female turkey farms in Italy.
In all model simulations we  assumed equal latency and trans-
mission rates for the two virus strains but a longer infectious
period for LPAI. These assumptions were based on an experimental
study that used viruses sampled from the Italian A(H7N1) epidemic
(Saenz et al., 2012). We  also conducted sensitivity analyses on the
HPAI latent period, HPAI transmission rate, and HPAI virus decay
rate spanning above and below that assumed for LPAI, providing
a broad range of biological scenarios (Table 1). Further details of
model assumptions are provided in Fig. 1.
3. Impact of immunological cross-protection at the ﬂock
levelThe daily percentage of birds infected with HPAI was computed
for each simulated outbreak as summarised in Fig. 2. Sensitivity
analyses investigating the impact of various infection parameters
demonstrated immunological cross-protection to have the great-
30 S. Nickbakhsh et al. / Epidemics 17 (2016) 27–34
Fig. 2. Impact of immunological cross-protection on ﬂock HPAI prevalence. Impact of immunological cross-protection (CP) on peak daily HPAI prevalence (% of birds infected
w athwa
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cith  HPAI on a single day) assuming (a) aerosol and environmental transmission p
arying levels of (c) HPAI infection latent period (1/), (d) HPAI transmission rate (
nd  (f) varying the background LPAI prevalence assuming 80% CP. See Table 1 for fu
st overall impact on ﬂock HPAI prevalence, ranging from 38% of
irds under zero CP to 50% under partial CP of 80%. Any further
ncreases in CP beyond 80% resulted in a decrease in peak preva-
ence, reaching a minimum 2.56% at 100% CP (Fig. 2a). Importantly,
hen the environmental component of transmission was  omitted,
he relationship between CP and peak prevalence was  reversed.
his ﬁnding reveals the importance of assumed transmission path-
ays on the dynamics of avian inﬂuenza co-circulation within a
oultry ﬂock (Fig. 2b).
In sensitivity analyses, shortening HPAI latency to 80% less than
hat of LPAI (from 1 day to 5 h) corresponded with an increase in
eak prevalence from 16% to 51% (Fig. 2c); increasing the rate of
PAI transmission to double that of LPAI (from 2 birds/day to 4
irds/day) resulted in an increase in peak prevalence from 18% to
0% (Fig. 2d); and decreasing the environmental decay rate of HPAI
o 50% less than that of LPAI (from 1.2 g/day to 0.6 g/day) resulted in
n increase in peak prevalence from 32% to 40% (Fig. 2e). The ﬂock-
evel infectious period (the number of days in which at least one
nfectious bird was present) was also sensitive to immunological
ross-protection, ranging 24 days at zero CP to 90 days at 80% CP.ys. Inset shows results for 0%- 80% CP, and (b) aerosol transmission only. Impact of
 (e) HPAI environmental decay rate () on peak daily HPAI prevalence under 0% CP,
details of the parameter values examined.
Finally we  investigated the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to the
initial background prevalence of LPAI within a single co-infected
commercial poultry ﬂock. Under an extreme scenario where all
birds were assumed LPAI-infected at day zero and assuming 80%
CP (20% susceptibility to HPAI), peak HPAI prevalence was reduced
from 50% to a minimum 26% of birds (Fig. 2f). However, the simu-
lated outbreaks were largely insensitive to LPAI prevalence below
20%. In all scenarios investigated, LPAI prevalence had no notable
impact on HPAI outbreak duration.
4. The avian inﬂuenza A(H7N1) epidemic in Italy,
1999–2001
The ﬁrst case of LPAI of the subtype A(H7N1) was notiﬁed in
northeast Italy in March 1999. By November that year the ﬁrst sus-
pected case of HPAI was  reported in the poultry dense region of
northeast Italy, Veneto. Phylogenetic analyses based on LPAI and
HPAI viruses isolated from this epidemic indicate that the HPAI
mutant emerged from the previously circulating LPAI viruses (see
Supplementary material and Banks et al., 2001; Monne et al., 2014).
pidemics 17 (2016) 27–34 31
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Fig. 3. Assessing the opportunity for epidemiological interference. (a) Spatial distri-
bution of poultry farms located in Lombardia and Veneto, northeast Italy; (b) Region
and  production/species-speciﬁc incidence of HPAI infected farms; (c) Inter-quartile
range of secondary HPAI infections across 100 model simulations for varying LPAI
prevalence (corresponding with case numbers of 10, 40, 80, 120, 160, 200 and 300
infected farms) and distance to the ‘emergent’ HPAI-infected ﬂock. dAll = no prox-S. Nickbakhsh et al. / E
y the time of HPAI emergence there were an estimated 199 LPAI
nfected ﬂocks and no means by which to enforce statutory control
easures against the LPAI epidemic (Capua et al., 2003). Impor-
antly for the spatial modelling analyses presented here, it is likely
hat LPAI viruses continued to circulate during the initial emer-
ence of HPAI and were the likely source of a second LPAI wave
ost-HPAI eradication in August 2000 (see Supplementary material
nd Monne et al., 2014).
In April 2000 HPAI was eradicated from Italy following the
mplementation of statutory control measures. Of the 413 HPAI
ases, 382 were conﬁned to Veneto and its neighbouring region of
ombardia (Capua et al., 2003). Based on a phylogenetic birth-death
kyline analysis conducted in BEAST2 software, median poste-
ior effective reproduction numbers estimated for both variants
ere consistent with HPAI-targeted control measures successfully
nhibiting HPAI epidemic growth but not LPAI. Further phylogenetic
iscrete-traits analysis also supported the likelihood that, in con-
rast to LPAI, the spread of HPAI was unconstrained by the poultry
pecies/production type or geographical region (see Supplemen-
ary material for further details).
Here we adapted a stochastic spatial transmission model origi-
ally parameterised for the HPAI epidemic wave in northeast Italy
see Dorigatti et al., 2010 for details) by incorporating the presence
f pre-existing LPAI cases at time zero of the HPAI epidemic. In
his modelling framework, susceptible farms acquired infection at
 rate estimated from the known timing of the 382 HPAI outbreaks,
he production cycles among the total 3247 poultry farms in pro-
uction during the epidemic period, and all pairwise inter-farm
patial distances. The premise of the model is that the probability
f transmission from an infected to a susceptible farm decreases
ith increasing spatial distance in a poultry species and epidemic-
hase dependent manner. The simulations also incorporate the key
ontrol measures that were enforced against HPAI during this epi-
emic: the culling of infected ﬂocks followed by a ban on ﬂock
e-stocking, and pre-emptive culling of farms located within a 1 km
adius of infected farms (See Dorigatti et al., 2010 for full details).
Because of geographical heterogeneity in the distribution of
oultry species/production types and the species/production-
peciﬁc incidence of infection in northeast Italy (Fig. 3a and b), we
nticipate that two key features of the pre-existing LPAI cases may
ffect the spread of emergent HPAI among the poultry population:
i) the number of pre-existing LPAI-infected ﬂocks present upon
PAI emergence, and (ii) the proximity of LPAI infected ﬂocks to
he ‘emergent’ HPAI-infected farm (i.e. the ﬁrst farm in which an
pidemiological ﬁt HPAI mutant emerged). Based on the ﬁndings
rom our discrete-traits phylogenetic analyses (see Supplemen-
ary material), we made no demographic-related constraints on the
pread of HPAI among the seeded LPAI cases.
. Modelling the epidemiological impact of immunological
ross-protection and LPAI-targeted control
We  ﬁrst investigated the effect of poultry demography on the
pportunity for a LPAI-infected farm to acquire a secondary HPAI
nfection. Note that in all spatial simulations, the infection status
f an individual farm was assumed to reﬂect the aggregated status
f all associated ﬂocks. To do so we seeded LPAI cases at random,
ither within 50 km of the ‘emergent’ HPAI-infected farm (d50km)
r under no distance constraint (dAll), whilst also varying the back-
round LPAI prevalence.
The spatial model simulations conﬁrmed a huge opportunity for
econdary HPAI incursions to occur in a commercial poultry set-
ing even when only a small number of LPAI cases were present
pon HPAI emergence; at least one LPAI farm experienced sec-
ndary HPAI infection in 81% of simulations when the backgroundimity constraint placed on location of LPAI cases; d50km = LPAI cases constrained to
within 50 km of the index HPAI farm. Note that these simulations were run in the
absence of immunological cross-protection assumptions.
prevalence of LPAI was  only 0.3% (n = 10 LPAI cases). The total num-
ber of secondary HPAI infections in a single epidemic simulation
increased with LPAI prevalence but was  less sensitive to the prox-
imity of LPAI to the ‘emergent’ HPAI farm (Fig. 3c).
We  then investigated the impact of immunological cross-
protection (CP) on HPAI epidemic risk (the proportion of
simulations resulting in >10 infected farms), epidemic size (cumu-
lative number of new HPAI cases) and epidemic duration (number
of days between ﬁrst and last HPAI cases). We explored three
scenarios: 80% CP, 100% CP, and LPAI-targeted control through
culling. Motivated by our ﬁndings on the within-ﬂock dynamics
(see Section 3), the 80% CP scenario was  based on the following
assumptions: (i) LPAI-infected premises had 80% protection against
(i.e. 20% susceptibility to) secondary HPAI infection for the dura-
tion of the production cycle, (ii) HPAI instantaneously displaced
pre-existing LPAI outbreaks upon co-exposure, and (iii) farms in
which LPAI displacement occurred had an 80% lengthening of the
infectious period for the duration of the production cycle.
In contrast, in the 100% CP scenario we assumed that LPAI
infected premises were fully protected against secondary HPAI
infections for the duration of the production cycle. In both 80% and
100% CP scenarios, ﬂocks resumed complete susceptibility to HPAI
upon ﬂock re-stocking at the start of the subsequent production
3 Epidemics 17 (2016) 27–34
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Fig. 4. Impact of immunological cross-protection and LPAI-targeted control on HPAI
epidemic risk, size, and duration. Probability density function estimates based on
spatial model simulations for (a) epidemic risk (probability of an HPAI epidemic i.e.
>10 cases). Each scenario is based on 100 × 7 model simulations (100 simulations per
LPAI prevalence investigated). Note decrease to lower limit of epidemic risk for 100%
CP  and LPAI-targeted control scenarios compared to in the absence of LPAI albeit
with wide conﬁdence intervals around the median estimate; (b) HPAI epidemic
size; and (c) HPAI epidemic duration. Horizontal lines indicate median estimates
and vertical bars indicate Binomial 95% conﬁdence intervals around the median. For
(a,c)  each scenario is based on 100 model simulations and assumes a background
LPAI prevalence of 6.2% (n = 200 LPAI cases) upon HPAI emergence. Density plots
were produced by adapting the ‘vioplot’ function of the package ‘violin’ available in
R  software v. 3.1.1 (Hintze and Nelson, 1998; R Core Team, 2013). See Supplementary2 S. Nickbakhsh et al. / 
ycle. Similar to 100% CP, the LPAI-target control scenario assumed
PAI-infected farms were insusceptible to HPAI but in this case as
 result of ﬂock depopulation (along with HPAI-infected premises),
s part of national control measures (note that at the time of the
pidemic statutory control measures were only enforced against
PAI). In contrast to the 100% CP scenario, this removal of suscep-
ible ﬂocks was induced for a longer period of time—the duration
f the HPAI epidemic.
We found that both immunological CP and LPAI-targeted con-
rol led to a reduction in the lower limit of HPAI epidemic risk to
elow that found in the absence of LPAI. The impact of 100% CP was
imilar to that produced by LPAI-targeted control; both scenarios
ed to a notable decrease in the lower limit of epidemic risk (Fig. 4a)
nd a signiﬁcant decrease in median epidemic size (Fig. 4b) com-
ared to in the absence of LPAI. However, despite these seemingly
eneﬁcial effects for the control of HPAI epidemics, 80% CP led to a
igniﬁcant increase in median HPAI epidemic duration whilst the
00% CP and LPAI-target control scenarios produced comparable
PAI epidemic durations as those observed in the absence of LPAI
Fig. 4c). The presented results are based on a LPAI prevalence of
.2% (n = 200 LPAI cases). We  note that the presented trends were
ualitatively similar for varying assumptions of LPAI prevalence
see Supplementary material).
. Discussion
Highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza continues to pose a signiﬁ-
ant global public health and economic threat. It is well recognised
hat HPAI viruses emerge through mutation of LPAI in domestic
oultry. During any emergence of HPAI that culminates in an epi-
emic it is evident that the precursor LPAI variant must co-circulate,
t least within the single (or potentially multiple) bird(s) in which
PAI emerges as “epidemiologically ﬁt”. However, despite their co-
irculation among poultry, the possibility of precursor LPAI viruses
nterfering with the spread of HPAI is not well understood. If we
re to learn from the devastating impact caused by A(H5N1) avian
nﬂuenza viruses, improved understanding of the ecological con-
itions that enable the invasion and spread of emergent HPAI in
omestic poultry could prove valuable for the veterinary control of
his disease.
Here, using mathematical models reﬂecting the two-pathogen
ransmission dynamics of avian inﬂuenza among commercial poul-
ry, we have demonstrated the potential role of immunological
ross-protection on the outcome of HPAI incursions in poultry
ocks. When simulating the co-circulatory dynamics within a sin-
le ﬂock, rather than inhibiting the spread of HPAI, our results imply
rimary infections with LPAI may  enhance farm-to-farm transmis-
ion because of an increase in peak ﬂock-prevalence. This ﬁnding
s explained by a trade-off between the effects of immunological
P on reducing host susceptibility whilst at the same time enhanc-
ng survivability; high but partial immunological CP maximises the
et effect of prolonged host survival. This ﬁnding echoes the his-
oric notion from an evolutionary standpoint that severe disease
ay  be sustainable when virulent pathogens are tolerated by the
ost (Ewald, 1983).
In the absence of comparative studies of avian inﬂuenza viral
inetics and infection life histories across homologous LPAI and
PAI viruses, we based the key infection parameters on an experi-
ental study conducted on LPAI and HPAI viruses sampled during
he Italian A(H7N1) epidemic (Saenz et al., 2012). Because HPAI-
peciﬁc infection parameters may  impact on the transmission of
PAI, we investigated the comparative importance of CP with
hese other infection parameters. For example, it is conceivable
hat the greater HA glycoprotein cleavability associated with HPAI
utant viruses results in a wider distribution of the virus withinmaterial for sensitivity analysis.
the host, a shorter time to infectiousness, and a greater viral load
during infection, thereby resulting in a greater transmission rate
and shorter latency compared with LPAI viruses. Our sensitivity
analyses revealed that peak HPAI prevalence and individual ﬂock
outbreak duration were less sensitive to these alternative factors
than to immunological CP.
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We  note that our inferences regarding the effect of immunolog-
cal CP on the spread of HPAI within a poultry ﬂock are based on
ssumptions built into the mathematical models and are therefore
imited by the possibility of missed effects of other unaccounted
or variables. In particular, further knowledge on the likely level of
P for a given bird at a given point in infection, and the potential
utcome of any within-host competition dynamic between the two
athogenic variants, would help enumerate more accurate predic-
ions for HPAI invasion success and spread at the ﬂock level.
Using a spatial simulation model representing the farm-to-farm
pread of HPAI A(H7N1) in northeast Italy (Dorigatti et al., 2010),
e explored the effects of immunological cross-protection and
PAI-targeted control within a heterogeneous commercial poul-
ry setting. We  found that both cross-protection and LPAI-targeted
ontrol scenarios reduced HPAI epidemic risk as a consequence of
epleting the pool of farms susceptible to HPAI incursions. How-
ver, cross-protection had the effect of prolonging HPAI epidemic
uration, thereby enhancing the long-term evolutionary success
f the novel and highly virulent HPAI mutants when epidemics
o arise. Interestingly, this effect of prolonged epidemic duration
as found under the assumption of partial (80%) but not complete
100%) immunological CP supporting the ﬁndings of a previous the-
retical modelling study (de Leo and Bolzoni, 2012) that partial CP
ay  be key to the epidemiological success of emergent HPAI.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate the measurable effect at the popula-
ion level of the trade-off between reduced farm susceptibility and
nhanced ﬂock infectious periods as a consequence of immuno-
ogical CP; the net effect of enhanced ﬂock infectious periods is
aximised under partial CP. Incorporating the likely heterogene-
ty in within-ﬂock dynamics across different farms, and improved
nderstanding into infection and immune kinetics of LPAI and HPAI
iruses during co-infection, would improve the accuracy of the
odel.
. Conclusion
Viral interference has a considerable potential to inﬂuence the
pidemiology of avian inﬂuenza in a densely populated commer-
ial poultry setting. Here, we show that, in simulation, LPAI need
ot inhibit the invasion of HPAI at either individual farm or popula-
ion scales. On the contrary, partial immunological cross-protection
ay  lead to the enhanced evolutionary success of HPAI. These
ndings may  have implications for veterinary control activities to
itigate the public health and economic impacts of avian inﬂuenza.
n particular, our ﬁndings regarding enhanced HPAI spread within
n individual ﬂock has importance for endemic settings such as east
sia where partial cross-protection to homo and heterosubtypic
vian inﬂuenza variants is a potential mechanism for the “silent
pread” of A(H5N1) within live bird markets (Imai et al., 2007).
ore generally, our study has implications for the effectiveness of
eterinary control measures against avian inﬂuenza (Savill et al.,
006).
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